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 These are appeals heard under the formal procedure 
pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, 
from the refusal of the Board of Assessors of the City of 
Northampton (“appellee” or “assessors”) to abate taxes on a 
certain parcel of real estate located in Northampton owned 
by and assessed to Alan and Marguerite Hankowski, trustees 
of the Crafts Avenue Realty Trust (“appellant”), under 
G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal years 2014, 2015, 
2016, and 2017 (“fiscal years at issue”). 
 Commissioner Rose heard these appeals.  Chairman 
Hammond and Commissioners Scharaffa, Chmielinski, and Good 
joined him in the decisions for the appellee.   
These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to 
a request by the appellant under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 
CMR 1.32.  
 
 Alan and Marguerite Hankowski, pro se, for the 
appellant. 
 
 Kenneth W. Gurge, Esq. for the appellee.   
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT 
On the basis of testimony and exhibits offered into 
evidence at the hearing of these appeals, the Appellate Tax 
Board (“Board”) made the following findings of fact. 
On January 1, 2013, January 1, 2014, January 1, 2015, 
and January 1, 2016, the relevant valuation and assessment 
dates for the fiscal years at issue, the appellant was the 
assessed owner of a 0.041-acre parcel of land improved with 
a mixed-use apartment and office building (“subject 
building”) located at 24 Crafts Avenue in Northampton 
(“subject property”).   
For fiscal year 2014, the assessors valued the subject 
property at $493,300 and assessed a tax thereon, at a rate 
of $15.39 per $1,000, in the total amount of $7,819.65, 
inclusive of the Community Preservation Act (“CPA”) 
surcharge.  The appellant timely paid the tax due without 
incurring interest and, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, 
§ 59, timely filed an abatement application on January 27, 
2014.  The assessors denied the abatement application on 
March 25, 2014, and on June 23, 2014, the appellant 
seasonably filed a Petition Under Formal Procedure with the 
Board.  On the basis of these facts, the Board found and 
ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide the 
appeal for fiscal year 2014.  
ATB 2018-512 
 
For fiscal year 2015, the assessors valued the subject 
property at $493,300 and assessed a tax thereon, at a rate 
of $15.80 per $1,000, in the total amount of $8,027.96, 
inclusive of the CPA surcharge.  The appellant timely paid 
the tax due without incurring interest and, in accordance 
with G.L. c. 59, § 59, timely filed an abatement 
application on January 28, 2015.  The assessors denied the 
abatement application on March 11, 2015, and on June 4, 
2015, the appellant seasonably filed a Petition Under 
Formal Procedure with the Board.  On the basis of these 
facts, the Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction 
to hear and decide the appeal for fiscal year 2015. 
For fiscal year 2016, the assessors valued the subject 
property at $534,900 and assessed a tax thereon, at a rate 
of $16.16 per $1,000, in the total amount of $8,903.30, 
inclusive of the CPA surcharge.  The appellant timely paid 
the tax due without incurring interest and, in accordance 
with G.L. c. 59, § 59, timely filed an abatement 
application on January 29, 2016, which was deemed denied on 
March 29, 2016.  On June 27, 2016, the appellant seasonably 
filed a Petition Under Formal Procedure with the Board.  On 
the basis of these facts, the Board found and ruled that it 
had jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal for fiscal 
year 2016. 
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For fiscal year 2017, the assessors valued the subject 
property at $534,900 and assessed a tax thereon, at a rate 
of $16.69 per $1,000, in the total amount of $9,195.30, 
inclusive of the CPA surcharge.  The appellant timely paid 
the tax due without incurring interest and, in accordance 
with G.L. c. 59, § 59, timely filed an abatement 
application on January 27, 2017, which was deemed denied on 
April 27, 2017.  On July 13, 2017, the appellant seasonably 
filed a Petition Under Formal Procedure with the Board.  On 
the basis of these facts, the Board found and ruled that it 
had jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal for fiscal 
year 2017. 
The appellant presented its case through the testimony 
of Alan Hankowski, the owner of the subject property, and 
the submission of documents including: property record 
cards for the subject property; tax bills for the subject 
property; and photographs and property record cards of 
purportedly comparable properties.   
The subject building was built in 1900, originally as 
a single-story building.  Subsequently, a second floor was 
added with a center staircase from the ground floor.  The 
subject building has a brick stone exterior, forced-hot-
water heating, and no central air conditioning.  The 
assessors grade the subject property as a C+.      
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The subject building’s property record card indicates 
that it contains a total of 140 square feet of office space 
on the first floor and a total of 3,220 square feet of 
residential apartment space on the first and second floors 
combined.  The residential apartment space is comprised of 
three one-bedroom apartments.  Mr. Hankowski testified that 
the rents are $775 per month for two of the apartments and 
$800 per month for the remaining third apartment.  The 
subject building’s office space houses Mr. Hankowski’s 
accounting practice.   
For each of the fiscal years at issue, Mr. Hankowski 
offered a capitalization-of-income analysis using eight 
purportedly comparable mixed-use properties.  However, he 
focused only on the office rent per square foot of his 
purportedly comparable properties, and he applied that same 
figure to the subject building’s total leasable area, 
including the residential space, which comprised the 
majority of the subject building’s leasable space.   
The appellee did not present a case but counsel for 
the appellee cross-examined Mr. Hankowski and questioned 
him about the appropriate methods for valuing commercial 
property.  Mr. Hankowski opined that the income-
capitalization approach was the appropriate method for 
valuing commercial property, but he admitted to using only 
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office-space rental figures and not researching residential 
rental figures.  The appellee rested on the validity of the 
subject assessments. 
On the basis of the evidence, the Board found that the 
appellant failed to meet its burden of proving a fair 
market value for the subject property that was less than 
its assessed value for each of the fiscal years at issue.  
Mr. Hankowski presented an income-capitalization valuation 
of the subject property using purportedly comparable mixed-
use buildings.  Only two of his eight purportedly 
comparable properties included residential units, rendering 
the majority of his selected properties not comparable to 
the subject property.  Moreover, of the properties that did 
include residential units, Mr. Hankowski compared only 
their office rental incomes.  The Board found that this 
method - selectively picking the office rents from the 
comparables and applying those income figures to the total 
leasable area - fatally undermined his analysis and 
rendered his opinions and conclusions unsubstantiated and 
without merit.    
Accordingly, the Board issued decisions for the 
appellee in these appeals. 
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OPINION 
The assessors are required to assess real estate at 
its fair cash value.  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is 
defined as the price on which a willing seller and a 
willing buyer in a free and open market will agree if both 
of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston 
Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956). 
“‘The burden of proof is upon the petitioner to make 
out its right as [a] matter of law to [an] abatement of the 
tax.’” Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 
Mass. 243, 245 (1974) (quoting Judson Freight Forwarding 
Co. v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 47, 55 (1922)).  In appeals 
before this Board, a taxpayer “may present persuasive 
evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or 
errors in the assessors’ method of valuation, or by 
introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines 
the assessors’ valuation.” General Electric Co. v. 
Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 600 (1984) (quoting 
Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 
(1983)). “[T]he board is entitled to ‘presume that the 
valuation made by the assessors [is] valid unless the 
taxpayers . . . prov[e] the contrary.’” General Electric 
Co., 393 Mass. at 598 (quoting Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 
245).  
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Generally, real estate valuation experts, the 
Massachusetts courts, and this Board rely upon three 
approaches to determine the fair cash value of property: 
income capitalization, sales comparison, and cost 
reproduction.  Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment 
Authority, 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978).  “The board is not 
required to adopt any particular method of valuation,” 
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 397 Mass. 
447, 449 (1986), but the income-capitalization method “is 
frequently applied with respect to income-producing 
property.”  Taunton Redev. Assocs. v. Assessors of Taunton, 
393 Mass. 293, 295 (1984).   
Under the income-capitalization approach, valuation is 
determined by dividing net operating income by a 
capitalization rate.  See Assessors of Brookline v. 
Buehler, 396 Mass. 520, 522-23 (1986).  The income stream 
used in the income-capitalization method must reflect the 
property’s earning capacity or economic rental value.  
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 397 Mass. at 451.  Imputing rental 
income to the subject property based on fair market rentals 
from comparable properties is evidence of value if, once 
adjusted, they are indicative of the subject property’s 
earning capacity.  See Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment 
Authority, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 289, 293-94 (1977), rev’d on 
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other grounds, 375 Mass. 360 (1978); Library Services, Inc. 
v. Malden Redevelopment Authority, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 877, 
878 (1980) (rescript).         
In the instant appeals, the Board found that 
Mr. Hankowski’s income-capitalization analysis was flawed 
because he failed to use sufficiently comparable 
properties.  Only two of his eight purportedly comparable 
properties even included residential units, and 
Mr. Hankowski compared only the office rental incomes.  The 
Board found that his office-rental figures failed to 
support an income figure for the subject property’s total 
leasable area that was comprised primarily of residential 
space.  The Board thus found and ruled that the appellant’s 
income-capitalization analysis failed to support a value 
for the subject property that was lower than its assessed 
value. 
The burden of proving a value that is lower than the 
assessed value is firmly on the taxpayer.  See Schlaiker, 
365 Mass. at 245.  The Board found and ruled that the 
appellant failed to meet its burden of proving a value for 
the subject property that was less than its assessed values 
for each of the fiscal years at issue. 
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Accordingly, the Board issued decisions for the 
appellee in these appeals. 
 
  THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD 
 
 
 
By:    ________________________________        
  Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman  
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